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In

The Supreme Gourt
of t:he

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

vs.
tANGELO TELLAY,
Defendant and App,ellant.

Appeal From Third Judicial District State of Utah
Salt Lake County
Hon. Clarence E. Baker, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
This case is unusual in that there is no question but
that the defendant (hereinafter called the appellant) is guilty of the crime charged. He so confesses. (Tr. 68). The record shows that he introduced no testimony to the contrary.
State's Exhibit A is a transcript of a former trial
beforfl Judge McConkie~ wherein the appellant was
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defendant, involving the same 'incident of intercourse as alleged in the instant information. Apparently (although not clearly revealed by the record)
appellant was charged in the forrner trial with rape
of one Helen ......... , committed on the 22nd day
of May, 1939, and as a defense to the prosecutrix's
testimony of force, appellant testified in substance
that he h'ad sexual intercourse with Helen as
alleged and p~roved, but that such intercourse was
not with force. (Tr. 68). Apparently the jury believed his testimony :and acquitted him of rape.
'The testimony of the prosecutrix shows- that she
was fift~en years of age ( Tr. 42') and that about
9:00 P. M., May 21, 1939, she left her home at 104
Yale Avenue and went for an auto ride "~th appellant and two other boys; that they \vent to a beer
garden and thence to a secluded place along Red\vood Road (Tr. 44). That the t\vo other boys left
the parked car; and, that app~ellant, by force and
against her will, had sexual intercours,e with her.
(Tr. 45). That she was not married. That she returned home about 1 :30 P. M. May 22nd and reported the affair to her mother ( Tr. 46).
Her mother testified in substance that her daughter
Helen came home about 1:30 P. M. May 22nd and
reported to her that: ''They got me.'' That her
hair was mussed up, her face was dirty; her dress
was torn and her stockings were torn.
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ARGUMENT
I
Appellant contends on the first proposition that it
was error to allow the introduction of the testimony
of the mother. We have s.earched appellant's brief
for his merits to the above contention. ·we fail to
find any good reason for his position. We have also
searched n1ost of the cases he has cited and fail to
find them analogous to the instant case. His cited
ease of State v. \\Tinslow, 30 U. 403; 85· P. 433, seems
to he more against his contention than in favor of
it. For the court held that the testimony of the
complaint of the incident by the prosecutrj;x to the
\ri tness \Yas ad.Ip.issible.
There seems no doubt but that a doctor's examination of the female organs of the prosecutrix inlmediately after the commission of the alleg·ed crime
is admissible. Surely then the physical condition
of the prosecutrix immediately after the alleged
commission of the crime as related by her mother
is admissible even though such testimony contains
the unsolicited words of the prosecutrix: that
''They got me.'' The rule is :
"In a prosecution for rape a complaint
made by the prosecutrix is admissible as
corroborative of her testimony, because it
is the natural and spontaneous expression
of feelings, but snch eomplaint made in ans,yer to questions is inadmissible.''
People v. Moore, 276 Ill. 392; 114 N. E. 906.

II.
The appellant contends· secondly that the court
Prr<>cl by allo,Ying State 'R Exhibit A to be intro<lured. Said exhibit is the transcript of record of
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a former ease, wherein appellant confessed to the
same act of intercourse under a charge of rape.
Appellant's cited cases do not seem to pertain to
his questioned error. They deal with incrilninating
questions on cross-examination of the accused,
(State v. Thorne, 76 Ut. 84; 287 P. 909) and with
the question of whether or not a confession was
voluntarily secured. (State v. vVells, 35 ·ut. 400;
100 P. 681).
In the instant case appellant never took the stand.
Hence a question of improper cross-exanilnation is
not applicable.
In the former trial appellant freely and voluntarily
'testified that he had sexual intercourse vvith the
prosecutrix at the time and place as charged
but that said intercourse was not through force as
was testified by the prosecutrix. Thus appellant
is foreclosed from· denying that this confession,
Exhibit A, was received involuntarily.
If app,ellant is comp·elled to testify in a judicial
proceeding then we concede his state1nents 1nade at
such judicial proceeding1 is no.t voluntary. Bnt in
the instant case appellant being charged with rape
did not have to testify. His taking of the witness
stand was his free and voluntary act.
'-The testimony of an accused voluntarily
given as a witness on a prior trial of himself or another p·erson, for the- same crime
"rj th which he iR being prosecuted may be
introduced against him.''
Underhill's Criminal Evidence,
Edition, Sec. 275, P. 545.

Fourth
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Ill.
Appellant's next contention is that he was once in
jeopardy. This he contends arises. out of the trial
court's refusal to allow him to introduce into evidence the records of the former case of ra.pe wherein he was acquitted; and also the trial court's instruction No. 5, to disregard the appellant's plea
of once in jeopardy. He says that the Legislature.
through Section 105-21-31, at p·age 226, Laws of
Utah, 1935, made it mandatory for the prosecuting
officials in charging rape to also put in a count
charging carn~l knowledge. That is to say, a
charge of the crime of rape also includes the crnne
of carnal knowledge. Said section as pertinent
provides.:
''The- information or indictment must
charge but one offense, but the same offense
1-nay be set forth in different forms· under
different counts; and V\rhen the offense may
bP committed h:' use of different means,
the means may be alleged in the alternative
in the same count; provided . . . . that
an information or indictment for rape may
contain a count for carnal kno,vledge . . . ''
(Italics ours).
The plain wording of the above quotPd provision
makes it discretionary whether or not a count in
carnal knowledg-e mav... be added to the crime of
rape. It is fundamental that V\7here th~ langu~ge of
a statute is plain it is not susceptible to judicial
interpretation.
'--/

The main point at issue under appellant'8 oncein-jeopardy contention is whether or not carnal
knowledge is an included offense '\vithin the crime
of rape. Appellant offered Exhibit 1 "\Yhich was
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the records and files of the former case of rape,
wherein appellant was acquitted. The trial court
apparently examined said records and files and
found ,as a matter of law that rape was not an included offense. Ap,pellant contends that the once
in jeopardy question should have been subn1itted to
the jury. It seems that such a contention is correct
when there is a question of fact rai~ed as to the
former jeop!ardy. In the instant case, there is no
question of fact. The appellant himself confesses
to carnally knowing the prosecutrix at the same
time and place, the transactions b~ing· one and the
same, so that all that was left to decide was a ques,tion of law as to 'vhether or not carnal knowledge
is an offense included within the crin1e of rape.
"The plea (once in jeopardy) is very
simple in its structure and conE:ists partly
of matter of record and partly of matter
of fact. The matter of record is the former
indictment and trial, while the matter of
fact is the averment of the identity of the
offense and of the defendant as the person
named in the former indictment.''
14 Am: Juris. 957.
Rape is a forced carnal knowledge,. It may be committed upon any female person. Carnal kno"rledge
is limited only to female persons between the ages
of thirteen and eighteen. The former is n1uch more
of a heinous crime. Our statute imposes for rape
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. It thus
follows that the intent is entirely different in each
of the crimes, the former being an intent to ravish
with force,. the latter being an intent only of carnally knowing the female under the age of cons~ent.
It would be impossible to commit the crime of carnal knowledge upon a female over eighteen years of
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ag·e. Thus it clearly app1ears that carnal knowledge
is not an included crime within the crime of rape.
The Constitution provides that one cannot he put
in jeopardy twice for the same offense. That constitutional provision does not mean that one cannot
be put twice in jeopardy for the sa.me transaction.
''The words 'same offense' mean san1e
offense, in the same transaction, in the
same acts, in the same circumstances or the
same situation.''
State v. Winger, (Minn.), 282 N. W. 819;
119 -A-~. L. R. 1202.
See also
L. R. A. Annotation at P. 1205.
We have searched the judicial authorities in an
effort to find a case on all-fours with the instant
case. Strictly spe·aking, we have been unable to
find such a case. However, we did find authority
holding that
''an acquittal _of rape is not a har to subsequent prosecution for s.eductiori, based
on the same single act of sexual intercour~.e. ''
Hall v. State, (Ala.), 32 S. 750.
The test laid down in the said Hall case is as follows= A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution, unless the accused could have been
convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of
the facts averred in the second. Such a test seems
to cover thoroughly the instant case in that it is
clear that the information and proof of carnal
knowledge could not warrant a conviction of ra.pe.
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From our search of the authorities, we believe that
the general principle of law is best stated in
15 American Jurisprudence, Section 390 at
P~ge 65:

''A putting in jeopardy for one act is no
bar to a prosecution for a separate and distinct act merely becaus.e they are so closely connected in point of time that it is impossible to separate the evidence relating
to them on the trial for the one of them
first had; consequently!' a plea of former
jeopardy will not be sustained where it
appears that in on@. transaction two distinct crimes were committed . . . ''
27 American .Jurisprudence at Page 29

says:
''According to the ·weight of authority an
acquittal of rape is no defense to a prosecution for incest based upon the same act
of sexual intercourse.''
The last quoted :general s,tatement is: found annotated in
IJ. R. A. 1915A, at Page 257, under the
case of

State v. Ros.e, 106 N. E. (Ohio) 50.
·Said Rose case, as

p~ertinent,

reads:

"It is not enough that some single element
of the offens~ charged may have a single
element of soine other offense as to which
the defendant has theretofore been in
jeopardy, but the constitutional provisions
require that it shall be thP 'same offense'."
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IV .
.A.ppellant 's next contention is based on the insufficiency of the evidence. His contention is centered
around the testimony of the p~rosecutrix 'vhen she·
''Te asked by Mr. Neeley: ''Are you Inarried ~''
answer: '~No, sir." Appellant contends that such
an answer did not prove that she \Vas not married
at the time of the commission of the offense.
The above quoted question and answer immediately
followed (Tr. 45) the testimony of the prosecutrix
wherein she related the act of sexual intercourse
committed by the appellant. The- reading of the
transcrip1t shows that the question of marriage was
related to the time of the alleged. act and not to the
time the witness was being examined by the District
Attorney. Therefore the element necessary 1n
proving carnal knowledge, that the prosecutrix
must he unmarried, "re believe is \Vell proved.

As stated before this case is unusual in that there is
no question of the appellant's guilt of carnal kno\vledge. Such overwhelming evidence, with no evidence to the contrary, \vith the ap·pellant's confession to that effect, even if prejudiciaJ error
arises, we believe such evidence \Yipes out all error.
Prejudicial error is overcome, dissipated and wiped
out where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
This doctrine is announced in the case of
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149; 277 Pacific 974,
and is later followed in the recent -case of
State v. Barone) 92 Utah 571; 70 Pacific
(2d) 735.
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'tV e believe that it would be a miscarriage of justice
lto allow this app1ellant to escape punishment
through a technicality of law or otherwise.
New Code of Criminal P·rocedure, Laws of
Utah, 1935, at P·age 222.

We further believe that he had a fair and impja-rtial
itrial and that the trial court's judgment should be
affirmed.
.8,espectfnlly submitted,

JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney ·General.

ZELPH S. CALDER,
Assistant Attorney General.
Attorneys for the ·State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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